South Carolina Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 5

Article 7

1966

COMMENTS

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Comments, 18 S. C. L. Rev. 847 (1966).

This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.
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COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DIVERSITY JURISDICTIONACQUISITION OF DOMICILE OF CHOICE*
The determination of the domicile of a party to a suit has
always presented a difficult problem in the area of diversity
jurisdiction of the federal courts. This problem has recently
arisen in Milliken v. Tri-County Elec. Co-op., Iwo.' Jurisdiction
of the federal district courts over civil actions may be based,
among other grounds, 2 on diversity of citizenship of the parties,3
this basis applying to suits removed to the federal courts from
4
state courts as well as suits originating in the federal courts.
In Milliken it was undisputed that the defendant, a corporation, was a citizen of South Carolina. It was also conceded that
the plaintiff, a natural person, had been a citizen of South Carolina until a very few days before filing of the suit and was at
the time of the hearing of the jurisdictional issue a citizen of
South Carolina. The sole question was whether the plaintiff on
the date suit was filed was a citizen of South Carolina or
Maryland.
The plaintiff, whose alleged change of domicile was challenged by the defendant, was a student in South Carolina at the
time of the injury giving rise to the suit. lie was a minor and
unmarried. His parents lived in Columbia, South Carolina. In
January 1965, he transferred from Clemson College to the University of South Carolina in order to be near his parents during
* Milliken v. Tri-County Elec. Co-op., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 302 (D.S.C. 1966).

1. 254 F. Supp. 302 (D.S.C. 1966).
2. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1333-1361 (1964).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964). Subsections (a) and (d) read as follows:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-

(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof; and

(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens

or subjects thereof are additional parties.
(d) The word "States", as used in this section, includes the Territories,
the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

A State cannot be a citizen of a State. Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430
(1886).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
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the periods between each of a series of operations, which were
to be conducted in Baltimore, Maryland. He attended the first
session of summer school at the University of South Carolina in
1965.
On July 16, 1965, the plaintiff went to Baltimore and rented
an apartment for three months. (He later rented it for the month
of October as well). He opened a bank account there, shipped
most of his clothes to Baltimore, and applied for a Maryland
driver's license which was refused because of his physical condition. He also registered to vote, although he may not have
been entitled to do so.
On July 18, 1965, two days after arriving in Baltimore, the
plaintiff became twenty-one. On that same day he entered Johns
Hopkins Hospital for an operation. On July 20, 1965, the plaintiff filed suit in the federal district court seeking damages for
the personal injury giving rise to the operations. He was released from the hospital on July 27, 1965, and several days later
came to Columbia. He spent some time with his parents at their
home and at the beach. Thereafter he returned to Baltimore to
prepare for a trip to Canada with his uncle. He returned to
Baltimore after the trip and entered the hospital there on September 12, 1965. During the four months for which the rent was
paid on the apartment in Baltimore the plaintiff lived in his
father's home more than he lived in the apartment.
Since the operation in September left him unable to care for
himself, he returned to South Carolina to live. In the fall term
of 1965 he enrolled in the University of South Carolina, stating
on his application that he was a citizen of South Carolina.
The finding of the court that the plaintiff was a citizen of
Maryland when suit was filed on July 20, 1965, seems to be based
primarily on two factors. The plaintiff and his parents testified
that after his transfer to the University of South Carolina in
January 1965, to be near his parents, they decided that due to the
possible emotional impact of successive operations "it would be
best for his own adjustment for him to go it on his own."'5 This
apparently is the reason he moved to Baltimore. He stated that
he expected to make Baltimore his home. Secondly, no one expected the operation in September 1965 to leave him in such a
helpless condition. The first factor evidently was taken as proof
of a bona fide intent to establish a domicile in Baltimore despite
5. 254 F. Supp. at 304.
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the evidentiary facts indicating the plaintiff went to Baltimore
merely for the purpose of the operation. The second factor was
apparently accepted as outweighing the impression given by the
plaintiff's return to South Carolina after the September operation that he never intended to become a citizen of Maryland.
Citizenship as used in the context of federal diversity jurisdiction embodies the concept of domicile0 and may be distinguished from residence. 7 As used in this discussion citizenship
will refer to that in a state of the United States. Domicile may
be thought of as the principal place of abode of a person or as
that place to which he has the intention of returning whenever
he is absent therefrom." Residence may mean a temporary place
of abode or one of several places in which one actually lives from
time to time. 9 It is well recognized that one can have but a single
domicile at any given time. 10 One must acquire a new domicile in
order to lose the old domicile.11 The change, however, requires
no particular period of residence but can be instantaneous. 1'2 It
is to be noted that the determination of domicile as giving rise
to federal jurisdiction is a federal question and the court is not
bound by the law of any state on the subject.' 3
Several types of domicile have been recognized, the difference
lying in the manner of acquiring each type. Domicile of origin is
that domicile with which one is born, generally being the domicile of his parents.' 4 In this latter respect the domicile of origin
is a specie of domicile by operation of law. Thus generally the
domicile of a minor follows the domicile of his parents although
6.
7.
8.
cases

Russell v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 325 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1964).
Jeffcoat v. Donovan, 135 F.2d 213 (9th Cir. 1943).
See 13 WoRDs AND PHRASES, "Domicile" 423-429 (perm. ed. 1965) and
cited therein.

9. See Stine v. Moore, 114 F. Supp. 761 (W.D. La. 1953) (dictum), aff'd,

213 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1954).
10. Two jurisdictions can, of course, make conflicting findings as to the
domicile of a person. Compare In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl.
303, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 660 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1933)

(deceased domiciled in Pennsylvania for inheritance tax purposes), with i re

Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 At. 601, supplemented 116 N.J. Eq.
204, 172 Ati. 503 (Prerogative Ct. 1934), decree sustained per curiam mtb nom.

Dorrance v. Martin, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 Atl. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd per

curiam, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 Atl. 743 (Ct. Err. & App.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.

678 (1936) (same deceased domiciled in New Jersey for inheritance tax
purposes).
11. Desmare v. United States, 93 U.S. 605 (1877).
12. Cooper v. Galbraith, 6 Fed. Cas. 472 (No. 3193) (C.C.D. Pa. 1819).
13. Taylor v. Milan, 89 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Ark. 1950).

14. Gates v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1952).
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the minor may never have been present in the state of domicile. 5
A married woman is said to assume the domicile of her husband
by operation of law despite the fact that she may never have
been in the state of her husband's domicile.' 6
The domicile of choice requires physical presence in the state
of domicile concomitant with the intention to make that state
a home for an indefinite period. It is not necessary that the
intent be to establish a permanent home but that there be no
present intention to depart therefrom. 17
The intent required to establish a domicile of choice is often
presumed to be absent in the concept of domicile by operation
of law. Thus it has been held that a married woman does not
establish a domicile of choice by living apart from her husband'
unless he has given her cause for separation. 19 The more modern
view is that she may establish a separate domicile by showing
actual intent.20 A child usually retains his parents' domicile until
his majority, but if he has been emancipated he may establish
21
a domicile of choice.

One ordered to military service is generally held to retain his
domicile on entering the service. 22 However, by a proper showing
of intent, such as requesting and obtaining assignment in a par23
ticular locality, he can acquire a domicile of choice.
Physical presence in the domicile of choice is essential. However, there need not be a home established. If the requisite intent
to establish domicile in the state exists, it is not necessary that
the new domicile is aca fixed local residence be adopted, and
24
quired upon entering into the state.
15. Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452 (1884); Schultz v. McAfee, 160 F. Supp.
210 (D. Me. 1958) (by implication).
16. Thompson v. Stalmann, 139 Fed. 93 (C.C.D. Nev. 1905); Wise v.
Bolster, 31 F. Supp. 856 (W.D. Wash. 1939).
17. Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 (1915); Chaney v. Wilson-Benner, Inc.,
165 F. Supp. 64 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
18. Seegers v. Strzempek, 149 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
19. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914).
20. Taylor v. Milam, 89 F. Supp. 880 (W.D. Ark. 1950) (alleged intent not
factually supported) ; see also Gallagher v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 185 F.2d
543 (3d Cir. 1950) (woman whose husband incarcerated for five to ten years
obtained new domicile).
21. Spurgeon v. Mission State Bank, 151 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1945), cert.
dcnied, 327 U.S. 782 (1946). While determination of plaintiff's domicile requires the use of federal law, this case used Missouri law to determine whether
the minor plaintiff had been emancipated. See text accompanying note 11

supra.

22. Wise v. Bolster, 31 F. Supp. 856 (W.D. Wash. 1939).
23. Ellis v. Southeast Constr. Co., 260 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1958).
24. Marks v. Marks, 75 Fed. 321 (C.C.D. Tenn. 1896).
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While some cases have explored technical aspects of presence,
such as when one owns a home which straddles a state line,2 5
the crucial issue seems to be intent. Intent must be distinguished
from motive, however. Even where the motive for moving one's
residence is to gain access to the federal courts in a certain dispute, there can be a change of domicile if there is a real intent
26
to establish a home in the new domicile.
The time at which the jurisdictional requisites must be met
is the time of the commencement of suit.2 7 A change in domicile
subsequent to filing of the suit in federal court does not divest
the court of jurisdiction. 28 However, facts occurring after the
filing but prior to the hearing of the jurisdictional issue certainly bear on the issue of intent at the time of filing. In the
leading case of Morris 'v. GiZer,2 9 the Court, while stating that
citizenship can be changed instantly and that motive is not important, found that the plaintiff had moved to Tennessee solely
for the purpose of bringing suit in the federal courts and intended to return to Alabama as soon as it was possible to do so
without losing his access to the federal courts through diversity
of citizenship. The Court held that the plaintiff did not have
the requisite intent to establish a new domicile and dismissed
the suit for want of jurisdiction.
In Milliken it is significant that the testimony showed that
the plaintiff's reason for returning to South Carolina to live
after the September 1965 operation arose out of a condition
unforeseen at the time of his move to Baltimore-the physical
helplessness to care for himself following the operation. Otherwise it would be difficult to reconcile the facts with the alleged
intent. Where the facts belie the intent, the facts must control.3 0
The question of domicile is a mixed question of fact and law. 1
If the facts are undisputed it is for the judge to determine the
question as a matter of law. However, the question of intent will
frequently be at issue and is a factual matter which may be
25. See generally 28 CJ.S. Domicile § 14 (1941) and cases cited thereunder.
26. Paudler v. Paudler, 185 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S.

920 (1951).
27. Conolly v. Taylor, 27 U.S. (2 Pet) 556 (1829).

28. Morgan's Heirs v. Morgan, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 290 (1817).

29. 129 U.S. 315 (1889).
30. Russell v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 325 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1964).
31. Maple Island Farm, Inc. v. Bitterling, 196 F.2d 55 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 832 (1952).
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decided by a jury in the court's discretion. 32 There33 is no right
to a jury trial on the issue of diversity jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction of the federal courts is never presumed 34 and the
burden of proof of diversity of citizenship is on the party alleging diversity.35 The establishment of a new domicile must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence as a presumption exists
36
against a new domicile having been acquired.
Basically the Milliken case reaffirms the proposition that concurrent presence and intent are all that is required to constitute
a change of domicile for a party sui juris. Finding the true intent of a party poses a difficult question. While, as in this case,
the observable facts may seem to indicate otherwise, the court
as trier of fact "must give credence to and weigh the evidence
before it."37 Where the evidence apparently forming the basis
of the court's decision consists of testimony given before the
court as to the subjective intent of the party alleging a change
of domicile, the party losing the jurisdictional issue at the district level will have great difficulty prevailing on appeal. The
appellate courts will not reverse findings of the trial court unless
they are clearly erroneous, recognizing that the trier of fact,
who had an opportunity to observe the witnesses, is in a better
38
position to judge their credibility than is a reviewing court.
This rationale of the "clearly erroneous" rule would seem to
make it less applicable to a decision based on demonstrable evidence of the conduct of the party allegedly changing his domicile, as here the credibility of the witness is less important. Since
it will not always be possible to convince the judge at the trial
level of the subjective intent of the party claiming a changed
domicile, and in order to enhance the chances of the claimant on
appeal, the attorney in advising a client desirous of changing his
domicile should have that client establish demonstrable evidence
39
of his intent to make the change.

C. PiNOENEY ROBETS
32, Seideman v. Hamilton, 275 F.2d 224 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 820

(1960).

33, Gilbert v. David, 235 U.S. 561 (1915).
34. Miller v. Lee, 241 F. Supp. 19 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
35, In re Chaney, 39 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Va.. 1941).
36. Maple Island Farm, Inc. v. Bitterling, 196 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1952),

quoting with approval from 28 C.J.S. Domicile §§ 16.a, 18.a (1941).
37. 254 F. Supp. at 305.
38, Walden v. Broce Constr. Co., 357 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1966); MidContinent Pipe Line Co. v. Whiteley, 116 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1941).
39. Chrystie, Where Is or Was or Will Be Your Client's Domicile?, PRAc.
LAW. Oct. 1955, p. 13 lists a number of steps one can take to demonstrate his
intent to establish a domicile.
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CRIMINAL LAW-CONFESSIONS-THE RESTRAINTS
SOCIETY MUST OBSERVE CONSISTENT WITH
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN
INTERROGATING SUSPECTS*
If, indeed, "lightning struck" our system of criminal justice'
in the 1964 case of Escobedo V. Illinois,2 then one might say that
an earthquake shook its very foundations when on June 13, 1966,
in an opinion, dealing with four cases, speaking for a court
sharply divided five to four, Chief Justice Warren announced
the decision in Miranda v,. Arizona. The essence of that decision,
more concerned with a definitive examination of the relationship
of the fifth amendment privilege to police interrogation than
with a specific concentration on the facts of the cases before
the court, was that before custodial interrogation has commenced,
the suspect must be warned that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in court, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him. These rights
attach on custody, but may be waived if the suspect does so voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The state has the burden
of proving both that warnings were given and followed by the
police and that, if waived, the waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made; all this must show affirmatively
for a silent record will not suffice. These rules apply to exculpatory as well as inculpatory statements by a suspect.
The decision marks what is perhaps the final stage in the
metamorphosis of the criteria for determining the admissibility
of confessions. To fix the Court's present position in this long
voyage, it is useful to chart its previous course. The test of admissibility by the Due Process clause began in 1936 with Brown
V. Mississippi.4 The "voluntariness" theme running through the
entire line of decisions has never been susceptible of a single
meaning but rather has been infused with a number of different
factors, the general test being best summarized as whether the
totality of the circumstances deprived the suspect of a "free
choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer" 5 and whether physi* Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
1. HAmL & KAmISA,

MODEm

CRmxINAL PRocmum 161 (1965).

2. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct 1602 (1966).

4. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
5. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1942).
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cal and psychological coercion attained such a degree that "the
defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed.", Important factors bearing on the inquiry were repeated or extended
interrogation, 7 threats or imminent danger,8 physical deprivation such as lack of sleep or food,9 limits on access to counsel
or friends, 10 length and illegality of detention under state law,,"
individual strengths and capacities of suspects 12 and the suspect's individual weaknesses or incapacities.' 3 Under the totality
of circumstances approach, no single one of these factors guaranteed exclusion; the court measured their impact in an ambulatory
fashion, determining to what degree they affected the confession
in each case.
As a matter of strict interpretation, it is difficult to place
E sobedo within the synthesis; it is anomalous in that it arose
under the assistance of counsel clause of the sixth amendment.
A general view of the corollary reasoning of the court in that
decision, however, makes it quite relevant, for there the court, in
affording the right to counsel prior to indictment, premised its
argument on the overview that a system of law enforcement that
depends on confession is inherently subject to abuse by police
officers and that the adversary system begins operation when
interrogation is commenced. Escobedo put one foot of the federal Constitution (the sixth amendment) in the door of the
station house, and by implication, opened that door for subsequent complete entry.
The great change that Miranda v. Ariona'4 makes in the
criteria for determining the admissibility of confessions is best
revealed by an examination of its premises. The major premise
is a strong suspicion of police tactics'15 and, accordingly, what
dissenting Justice White portrays as a "deep-seated distrust of
all confessions.""' This leads to the conclusion that all police
6. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois,

372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
7.Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
8. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
9. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
10. Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).

11. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
12. Croaker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).

13. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
14. 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
15. Described by dissenting Justice Harlan as "a generally black picture of
police conduct painted by the court." Id. at 1649.
16. Id. at 1661 (White, J., dissenting).
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interrogations are inherently coercive and that all such pressure
on the suspect should be eliminated. The holding is tantamount
to saying that once in custody the first response to the first question is presumed to be the product of an overborne will. Thus
the court replaces all the previous factors employed in resolving
whether a suspect's will was, in fact, overborne with the absolute
presumption that it was in the absence of an affirmative showing
that warnings were given and that the suspect knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights. "Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can
truly be the product of his free choice." 7z In fairness to the
court, two things should be pointed out. The first is that the
majority makes no pretense to the effect that they are following
precedent in determining admissibility, admitting that "in these
cases, we might not find the defendants' statements to have been
involuntary in traditional terms.""' The second is that the court
had a compelling reason for rejecting the earlier test of totality
of circumstances; i.e., the possibility that a violation of the
sanctity of the constitutional guarantees of the fifth amendment
by the police could be irredressable because of problems of proof
imposed on the defendant. That is to say, that under the previous
test, defendants were saddled with the burden of proving an
overborne will, a grave task considering the fact that the police,
the defendant's adversary, have the only means of corroborating
testimony. Or, in the words of the Court, shifting the burden of
proof to the state:
Since the State is responsible for establishing the isolated
circumstances under which the interrogation takes place
and has the only means of making available corroborated
evidence of warnings given during incommunicado interrogation, the burden is rightly on its shoulders.19
Thus, it is submitted that the Court's absolute presumption of
coercion in the absence of warnings, rejecting the former criteria
for determining admissibility, was motivated by the fact that
under the traditional rule, injustice might be done some defendants who, while in fact coerced, could not prove it. This seems
a commendable objective when one, casually examining the
17. Id. at 1619.
18. Id. at 1618.

19. Id. at 1628.
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aforementioned criteria under the previous test, realizes that
those criteria were all external standards, such as the length of
interrogation, which necessarily fail to measure the psychological
impact of a given interrogation tactic on a given defendant, in a
given place and time. In essence, they fail to consider what
transpires in the interrogation room itself.
A. Progressionfrom Escobedo
20
As a convenient method of compassing the scope of Miranda,
an examination of the progress it marked from Esoobedo is
offered. In scrutinizing the principal questions left open by
Escobedo, initial treatment will be accorded those explicitly
answered by the majority in Mirand 21 ; subsequently, questions
implicitly addressed by the Court's reasoning in the latter decision will be explored.
The most debated areas left open by Escobedo revolved around
the right to counsel: whether the suspect must request counsel,
whether he is entitled to the continued presence of counsel, and
whether counsel will be appointed for indigent defendants. Not
only were the scholars divided on these questions, the courts were
as well. Some state courts confined Escobedo strictly to its facts,
stating that it does not apply unless counsel is trying to get into
the interrogation room or unless he has instructed police to stop
questioning his client, 22 a narrow interpretation indicative of
obdurate refusal to discard the old standards, which, incidentally, portends a confusing fate for some of the less clear areas
of Miranda.23 Most state courts held that the Escobedo rationale
does not come into play unless and until the suspect has specifically requested counsel.2 4 Both a prominent state court 25 and the
Third Circuit 20 held that the right was not dependent upon a

20. Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct 1602 (1966).

21. Ibid.
22. State v. Fox, 151 Iowa 479, 131 N.W.2d 684 (1964); State v. Howard,

383 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1964); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d

852 (1965).
23. Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
24. People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 961 (1965) ; State v. Smith, 43 N.J. 67, 202 A.2d 669 (1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 1005 (1965); Linde v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 331, 206 A.2d 288
(1965) ; Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964), cert. denied,

379 U.S. 1004 (1965).

25. People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 946 (1965).
26. United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 351 F.2d 429 (3d Cir. 1965).
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request. Miranda2 7 holds that the suspect doesn't have to request
counsel; that he will be warned of his right to counsel and will
get counsel unless he waives that right; that if he is indigent,
counsel will be appointed, and, apparently, that he is entitled to
the continued presence of counsel. The last assertion is supported
by the court's reasoning that "even preliminary advice given to
the accused by his attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret
28
interrogation process."
In an ancillary fashion, Escobedo directed attention to several
other questions: whether the suspect should be warned of his
rights to silence and counsel; whether rewarnings were necessary
with each new interrogation technique; and finally, whether the
rights that attach at custody apply to misdemeanants. Miranda2 9
answered the first two questions by requiring warnings and prohibiting further questioning and use of subsequent interrogation
techniques in the absence of a waiver of rights. The possible
availability to misdemeanants of these rights is still unresolved.
Miranda0 breaks with Escobedo also in that it constitutes a
shift in the treatment of the right to counsel. In both Gideon v.
Wainwright3 1 and Escobedo, the right to counsel had been
treated as rising under the sixth amendment. In the instant case,
the right is viewed under the fifth amendment; the court reasoning that the indispensable safeguard against a coerced confession
is the presence of an attorney.
B. Problem Areas
The two aspects of the decision that most obviously promise
disagreement and confusion are the questions of when the suspect's rights attach and what might constitute a "knowing and
intelligent" waiver.
It is simplistic to say that the rights attach when custodial
interrogation begins. Custody occurs when the suspect is detained against his will, either through an explicit arrest or detention brought about through duress, coercion, or threats.8 2 Although courts have often used the word "custody" as synonymous
27. Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
28. Id. at 1625.

29. Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602 (1966).
30. Ibid.
31. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
32. United States v. Mitchell, 179 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1959).
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with "arrest,"88 it is submitted that the court in the instant case
views it as occurring when the suspect is removed from familiar
surroundings against his will. The thrust of the Court's reasoning
in this area seems to be that it is the intimidating, coercive aura
of the station house that acts as a compulsion on the suspect and
that, conversely, in field interrogation "the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not
necessarily present. 834 Elsewhere the court ventured that an
individual in familiar surroundings might not feel himself under
any compulsion. In stating that the compelling atmosphere is
"not necessarily" present outside the station house, the court apparently left the question of the admissibility of confessions
obtained in the field ambulatory, subject to the impact of particular facts on particular cases. For instance, a police car would
probably be held to have a compelling atmosphere; it certainly
is far removed from familiar surroundings. However, a confession in response to mild questioning in a suspect's home, absent
warnings and waivers, when he is clearly not restrained would
probably be admissible.
Without doubt, the greatest problem posed by the decision is
the question of what constitutes a "knowing and intelligent"
waiver of the right to silence and the right to counsel. The
previous requirement had been only that the confession be voluntary; now, it must be made knowingly and intelligently as
well.
A waiver of the right to silence obviously would be accepted
as knowing and intelligent if it were made in the presence of
the suspect's attorney.
The presence of counsel in all cases before us today, would
be the adequate protective device necessary to make the
process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the
privilege. His presence would insure that statements made
in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion. 5
Much greater difficulty is posed by a waiver of the right to
counsel. If such a waiver is followed by interrogation and con33. United States v. Scott, 149 F. Supp. 837, 840 (D.D.C. 1957). Judge
Youngdahl quoted authorities to the effect that "the term arrest may be applied
to any case where a person is taken into custody or deprived of his full
liberty . . . ."
34. Miranda v. Arizona, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 1630 (1966).
35. Id. at 1623.
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fession as previously indicated, the state has the burden of demonstrating that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self incrimination and his right
to counsel. Waiver will not be presumed from a silent record.
The record must affirmatively show that the accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected it.
The individual does not waive his right to silence by answering
some questions before invoking that right. All questioning must
cease once the right to silence has been invoked; the same applies
to the right to counsel with the exception that once counsel is
present, in the absence of overbearing, some further questions
may be permitted. Further, the mere fact that a defendant signs
a statement containing a typed-in clause admitting that he has
full knowledge of his legal rights, doesn't approach the knowing
and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional
rights.
The rationale of the court in viewing counsel as the shield
against the compelling atmosphere virtually presumes that there
can be no knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.
The opinion lists only one circumstance in which such a waiver
might be upheld as valid; that is that "an express statement that
the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want
an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a
waiver.130 The important words here are "followed closely."
However, other language in the opinion casts doubt upon even
the foregoing qualifying as a waiver. For instance, in discussing
the coercive atmosphere of the station house, the Court points up
the great importance of the presence of an attorney thusly:
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can
operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made
aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the
right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. 87
And further:
Whatever the testimony of the authorities as to the waiver
of rights by the accused, the fact of lengthy interrogation
or incommunicado incarceration before a statement is made
36. Id. at 1628.
37. Id. at 1625.
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is strong evidence that the accused did not validly waive his
rights. In these circumstances, the fact that the individual
eventually made a statement is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling influence of the interrogation
finally forced him to do so.""
The problem is most sharply pointed up in the dissents of Justices Harlan and White. The former urges that "those who use
third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and
destined to lie as skillfully about [warnings and] waivers."3 9
The latter inquires "if a defendant may not answer without a
warning a question such as 'Where were you last night.' without
having his answer be a compelled one, how can the court ever
accept his negative answer to the question of whether he wants
to consult his retained counsel or counsel whom the court will
appoint?" 40 He concludes that in claiming a waiver of counsel
"the State faces a severe, if not impossible burden of proof." 41
7.The Possibility of Statutory Alternatives
Here, it is enough to say that the procedures established by
the Court are not absolute, in the sense that the Court indicates a
willingness to accept adequate alternatives.
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives
for protecting the privilege which might be desired by Congress or the states in the exercise of their creative rulemaking capacities. Therefore, we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation
process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way
creates a constitutional strait-jacket which will handicap
sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect.
We encourage Congress and the states to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown
other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising
accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a
38. Id. at 1629.
39. Id. at 1644 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1660 (White, J., dissenting).
41. Ibid.
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continuous opportunity to exercise it, the [following] safeguards must be. observed. 42
The fact that the Court did not foreclose the possibility of state
action is important because it is probable that the former sharp
conflict between the police and a suspect over how the police
asked the questions will now shift to a dispute as to how they
gave the requisite warnings, when they gave them, and whether
they subsequently undermined them. Similar contention will
doubtless arise over the question of whether waivers were knowingly and intelligently made. It is thus manifest that state action
stripping the interrogation process of its secrecy will be necessary
to insure its efficacy; further, since the burden of proof, a high
one, is now on the state, such action would be in the best interests of the police. Proposals such as taping and filming the interrogation or having a judicial party present could meet this need.
Such schemes, of course, would merely supplement rather than
replace the safeguards promulgated by the court.
D. General Guidelines for Police and Prosecutors
In virtually eviscerating the custodial interrogation process,
the decision has added greatly to the problems of adjustment
already faced by our law enforcement officers as a consequence
of the recent revolution in criminal justice. Accordingly, several
minimal, general guidelines
are offered:
1. Immediately upon taking a suspect into custody, an unequivocable warning of the right to silence and counsel, appointed or retained, together with an admonition that any statements made can be used in court against the defendant, should
be made. The warning should be made immediately upon arrest
to avoid such a situation as incarcerating the suspect without
warning or interrogating him, then later eliciting a confession
after warnings had been made and rights had been waived. In
such a case, the confession would probably be inadmissible because the incarceration would be viewed as compulsion.
2. Before interrogating a suspect, a qualified independent
party, such as a magistrate should re-issue the warnings. This
is necessary both because the fact that warnings were given
must show affirmatively on the record and because the police
will probably lose any "swearing contest" with a defendant who
42. Id. at 1624.
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denies that the warnings were given or asserts that they were
improperly given. This heavy burden on the police is a logical
outgrowth of the Court's rationale that since the state established the isolated circumstances of interrogation and has the
only means of corroborating evidence, it should bear the yoke
in this area.
If counsel for the suspect is on hand, making the warnings in
his presence would serve the same purpose as having an independent party do so.
3. If the suspect wishes to waive any rights as to the existence
of which he has been warned, this waiver should take place before an independent party unless counsel for the suspect is present. The state has the burden of proof here and should make
certain that it has independent, corroborating authority that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived.
4. In any case where conviction is unusually important to law
enforcement officials, a waiver of the right to counsel by the
suspect should not be accepted, and counsel should be appointed
despite defendant's wishes. As previously suggested the state will
have great difficulty proving a knowing and intelligent waiver
of the right to counsel, if indeed, it can be proved at all. Law
enforcement officials should exercise extreme caution in this area
until further decisions clarify it.
This decision, predicated on the premise that police interrogation is inherently subject to abuse without adequate legal safeguards, goes far in the direction of moving the courtroom into
the station house. It is manifest that interrogtaion is well on
the way to becoming a quasi-judicial process.
JArss L. MA&N
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INSURANCE-LIABIL1TY OF INSURER FOR
UNREASONABLE DELAY IN ACTING
UPON AN APPLICATION FOR
INSURANCE*
A common problem facing the courts is the liability, if any,
that an insurance company incurs for failure to pass upon an
application for insurance within a reasonable period of time.
The classic situation is generally as follows: the plaintiff has
made his application and paid a premium; the application and
the premium have been forwarded to the home office for action
thereon; the home office has failed to take prompt action, and
during the delay the applicant-plaintiff suffers the injury he
sought to insure against; the plaintiff, because the insurance
company did not act, has nothing to help defray the expenses
of his injury. Relying on the insurance company to act, he has
not sought insurance elsewhere. 1
Recently this problem arose in South Carolina in Hinds v.
United Ins. Co. of Amerca.2 Because of the delay of the insurer
in acting the policy issued to the plaintiff did not cover the
plaintiff's heart attack. The plaintiff brought suit in tort alleging that due to the insurer's negligence in failing to act within
a reasonable time the plaintiff's illness was not covered by the
policy. The plaintiff further sought punitive damages, alleging
that the insurer's delay was of sufficient length, taken with other
facts, to give rise to the inference of willful and wanton conduct
which would support an award of punitive damages. The court
* Hinds v. United Ins. Co. of America, 149 S.E2d 771 (S.C. 1966).
1. This fact situation may be varied. Among the more common fact situa-

tions are failure of the agent to forward the application and failure of the
insurance company to notify the applicant of rejection within a reasonable
time.

2. 149 S.E.2d 771 (S.C. 1966). The fact situation here varies somewhat.
did not cover that the plaintiff had understood it would. An agent of the defendThe plaintiff had let a second policy issued by the defendant lapse because it

ant told the plaintiff that if he, the plaintiff, applied and paid a premium before
March 15, 1963, the first policy the plaintiff had acquired from the defendant

could be reinstated. The plaintiff did this on February 19. The defendant, by
another agent, notified the plaintiff that the policy could not be reinstated, this
notice not coming until July 23, 1963, approximately five months later. The

plaintiff thereupon applied for a new policy, as the defendant's agent said he
would have to do, and paid an additional amount, which together with the
premium from the prior application, would be the premium for the new policy.
The new policy was not issued until September 25, 1963, and was to be effective only from the date issued. The plaintiff suffered a heart attack March 20,
1964, but, by a provision excluding from the defendant's liability any expense
suffered within six months of the effective date of the policy, the plaintiff was
not covered therefor.
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held that the plaintiff had stated facts, not only sufficient to
give rise to a cause of action in tort, but also sufficient to support
an award of punitive damages.
While there have been a number of similar causes of action
brought in other courts,3 and a remedy allowed in tort, this
decision is important because of its ruling as to punitive damages. The ruling is unique, 4 for no other court has ever allowed
an award of punitive damages in this type of action. It is the
purpose of this comment to consider the decisions of other courts
facing this factual situation and to note briefly where South
Carolina stood at the time of Hinds.
A. Liability under the Contract Theory
Before any remedy may be invoked in reliance upon the contract theory, the existence of a contract must first be established.
Under the contract theory the general rule is "that mere delay
in passing upon an application for insurance cannot be construed
as an acceptance of it by the insurance company which will support an action ex contractu."3 Where, however, the insurance
company accepts the premium and retains it for an unwarranted
length of time an inference of acceptance may be raised, 6 though
this is not always true.
In HartfordFire Ins. Co. v. Garvin,7 the South Carolina Supreme Court coupled retention of premium with a misleading act,
though not intentionally misleading, to imply acceptance of the
contract by the insurance company.8 In other South Carolina
cases the court has emphasized that along with the retention of
the premium there was a misleading act or representation, and
that taken together they give rise to the inference of acceptance. 9
3. The first was Carter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 11 Hawaii 69 (1897).

Hinds was only the second occasion South Carolina granted a tort remedy
in this situation, the first being in Tobacco Redrying Corp. v. United States

Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 S.C. 162, 193 S.E. 426 (1937).

4. Hinds v. United Ins. Co. of America, 149 S.E2d 771, 776 (S.C. 1966).
273 Pac. 667, 674
5. Raymond v. National Life Ins. Co., 40 Wyo. 1, -,
(1929). See also Linnastruth v. Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n, 22 Cal. 2d
216, 137 P.2d 833 (1943) ; Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 295 Ill. 381, 129
N.E. 171 (1920).
6. 12 APPLEarAN, INsURAxcE LAW & PRACTICE, § 7226 (1943).
7. 136 S.C. 307, 133 S.E. 29 (1926).
8. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvin, 136 S.C. 307, 133 S.E. 29 (1926).
9. Ward v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 582, 103 S.E2d 48 (1958);
Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 222 S.C. 492, 73 S.E.2d 688 (1952).
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Similar results obtain in some other jurisdictions. 10 A few courts
have gone further by determining that if the application provided for the prompt return of premiums if the application was
rejected, failure to return the premiums within a reasonable time
implied acceptance."
The most important factor in these cases is the delay of the
insurer. Although there is no standard formula by which the
question of unreasonableness of delay may be phrased, it is generally held to be a question for jury determination regardless
of its phrasing. 12 If unreasonableness is established and liability
found, the amount of damages the jury may award the plaintiff
in a suit on the contract of insurance and its breach is limited
to the face amount of the policy.' 3 South Carolina is the only
state that allows an exception to this rule.' 4 Closer attention to
this exception is reserved for later consideration.
From the material in this area it is clear that the courts agree
only that there may be a recovery and that whether there was
an unreasonable delay is a question for the jury. In making this
determination, the courts often confuse the contract theory with
the tort theory of recovery. This was exemplified in American
Life Ins. Co. 'v. Hutheson'5 where the court indulged in a recitation of the fundamentals underlying the tort theory of recovery and then held for the plaintiff in contract. Another court
went further and found a legal duty, a fundamental of the tort
theory, and used it as grounds to imply acceptance in its decision
under the contract theory.' 6 This disparity of opinion, however,
is not to be found in the contract theory alone.
10. Bellak v. United Home Life Ins. Co., 211 F2d 280 (6th Cir. 1954);

Fitzgerald v. Colorado Life Co., 233 Mo. App. 235, 116 S.W.2d 242 (1938);
Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899).
11. Cloyd v. Republic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 137 Kan. 869, 22 P2d 431 (1933);

Reck v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 116 N.J.L. 444, 184 At. 777 (1936).
12. Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S.E. 70 (1925)

(reason-

ableness of delay question for jury); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvin, 136
S.C. 307, 133 S.E. 29 (1926); Fitzgerald v. Colorado Life Co., 233 Mo. App.
235, 116 S.W.2d 242 (1938).
13. No state except South Carolina allows punitive damages in a suit for
breach of an insurance contract. Mooney, Punitive Damages for Breach of
In.srance Contracts in South Carolina, 1957 INs. L. J. 20.

14. Ibid.
15. 109 F.2d 424 (6th Cir.) ; cert. denied, 310 U.S. 625 (1940).

16. Robinson v. United States Ben. Soc'y, 132 Mich. 695, 94 N.W. 211
(1903).
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B. Liability under the Tort Theory
The tort theory, which arose because there was only slight
chance of recovery in contract, did not appear until 189717 and
failed to achieve significant recognition until 1913.18 In that year
Duffy v. Bankersa' Life Assn, 9 the leading case in this area and
the one which laid the basis for the development of the tort
theory, was decided.
The court, in Duffy, in imposing a legal duty on the insurance
company, stated:
But it is said that a certificate or policy of insurance is
simply a contract like any other, as between individuals,
and there is no such thing as negligence of a party in the
matter of delay in entering into a contract. This view overlooks the fact that the defendant holds and is acting under
a franchise from the state. The legislative policy, in granting
this, proceeds on the theory that chartering such association
is in the interest of the public to the end that indemnity of
specific contingencies shall be provided those who are eligible
and desire it, and for their protection the state regulates,
inspects, and supervises their business. Having solicited
applications for insurance, and having so obtained them and
received payment of the fees or premiums exacted, they are
bound either to furnish the indemnity the state has authorized them to furnish or to decline to do so within such a
reasonable time . . . or suffer the consequences flowing
20
from their neglect so to do.

In imposing this legal duty upon the insurance company, the
court called attention to the public interest and the franchise
granted therefor. The idea was simply that there was public
interest in insuring contingencies, such as death, in a life insurance policy. The legislature acted to provide the public with
insurance if they were eligible and desired it, and to protect
the public from any capriciousness the insurance companies
might practice on the public by requiring the insurance company
to act within a reasonable time. This reasoning is supported by
17. Carter v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 11 Hawaii 69 (1897).
18. Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913). It
should be noted that one other case imposing tort liability was decided prior
to Duffy. Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac.

329 (1912).

19. Duffy v. Bankers Life Ass'n, supra note 18.
20. Id. at 1087-88.
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cases 21 and by authors2 2 and it seems to be the prevailing view
23
for the imposition of tort liability. This legal duty was found
in Tobacco Redrying Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. 10.24
and reaffirmed by the South Carolina court in Hinds.
Some courts, though granting the same remedy as Duffy, have
adopted their25own reasons which may be divided into five distinct classes:
1. Contracts of insurance and negotiations therefore, by
their purpose and nature, are impressed with characteristics
26
unlike any other contracts and negotiations for contracts.
This seems to imply that the parties are of unequal standing; therefore, the insurance company is held to a higher
standard.
2. From the nature of the risk "a reasonably prudent
businessman, guided by considerations which ordinarily
regulate conduct, would have acted with diligence." 2 7 The
court here adds a new twist to the prudent man theory of
torts.
3. An implied contractual relationship is created, based
on the solicitation and receipt by the insurance company of
an offer to enter into a contractual relationship, whereby
the insurance company is said to have assented to act with
diligence and to return the premium if the application is
28
rejected.
4. Where the applicant has paid a premium and the policy is to be in effect from the date of application (if the
insurance company approves the application) the insurance
21. E.g., Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 139 Cal. App. 577, 34 P2d 731 (1934) ;
Republican Nat'1 Life Ins. Co. v. Chilcoat, 368 P.2d 821 (Okl. 1961); Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okl. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1923).
22. 12 APPLFX=AxN, op. cit. supra note 6, § 7226; Funk, The Duty of Insurer
to Act Promptly on Applications, 75 U. PA. L. Rv. 207 (1927).
23. See generally Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 487 (1953).

24. 185 S.C. 162, 193 S.E. 426 (1937).
25. This classification is from Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 487 (1953).
26. Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soe'y of United States, 70 N.D. 122,
293 N.W. 200 (1940).
27. Boyer v. State Farmers Mut. Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 444, 121 Pac.
329, 331 (1912).

It should be noted that Kansas decided cases in contract both

before and after Boyer; Harvey v. United Ins. Co., 173 Kan. 227, 245 P.2d
1185 (1952) ; Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899).
28. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Taliaferro, 176 Okl. 242, 54 P.2d 1069 (1935). See
also Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W.
403 (1931).
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company should not be allowed to unduly prolong retention
29
of the premium without incurring risk.
5. The insurance company, by receipt of the premium conditioned on its acceptance of the offer, becomes a trustee for
the return of the premium if the offer is not accepted and
for unconditional acceptance of the premium if the application is approved.8 0
Generally, the courts imposing liability in tort have held that
the question of unreasonable delay was one of fact to be decided
by a jury."' The amount of damages that may be awarded by
the jury has been held to be no more than the face amount of
the policy. 32 But it must be remembered that none of these
courts has been faced with the issue of punitive damages. The
decision in Hinds could, in this respect, mark a significant milestone in the area of tort liability.
0. The Theo'ry of No Liability
The theory of no liability proceeds under the assumption that
silence and delay will not imply acceptance, 3 but, rather should
arouse the presumption of rejection.

mium is regarded as

immaterial.3 8

4

The retention of the pre-

From these assumptions the

courts generally follow a line of disputing one or more of the
reasons set forth for imposing tort liability. The leading case
under the no liability theory is Savage v. Prudential Life Ins.
s
which takes aim at the "legal duty" reasoning
Co. of America,3
in Duffy by stating that a franchise imposes no special duties.
Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States"7 enlarges the attack made by Savage in arguing that all other cor29. DeFord v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924).
30. Strand v. Bankers' Life Co., 115 Neb. 357, 213 N.W. 349 (1927).
31. Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 139 Cal. App. 577, 34 P.2d 731 (1934);
Duffy v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913).
32. E.g., Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., supra note 31. See also Funk, supra
note 22.
33. United Ins. Co. of America v. Headrick, 275 Ala. 599, 157 So. 2d 19
(1963) ; Cauthen v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 228 Miss. 441, 88 So. 2d
103 (1956).
34. Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S.E. 70 (1925); Ross v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 124 N.C. 395, 32 S.E. 733 (1899).
35. Hayes v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 198 Va. 670, 96 S.E.2d 109 (1957).
These assumptions alone dispute the contract theory.
36. 154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929).
37. 2 F. Supp, 914 (W.D. Mo. 1933).
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porations are franchised by the state but no one had seriously
considered imposing such a duty on them. Swentusky v. Prudential Is.Co. of America,38 arguing that there was no fundamental legal basis for imposing a duty because of public interest,
also stated:
But to hold that, because of these facts alone (franchise
and public interest), there are imposed upon it duties or
liabilities having no sanction in the established principles
of law or in the statutes governing the insurance business
would be to open a field of legal liability the limits of which
we cannot encompass, and which would go far to introduce
39
chaos in the entire business of insurance. ....
These cases give a fairly complete picture as to what the "no
liability" courts have held in regard to legal duty as a basis for
recovery in tort. A series of reasons other than that of legal duty
has been considered by the no liability courts for granting a
remedy in tort.
1. To impose a duty to exercise reasonable care in dealing with
an offer of an applicant runs afoul of the basic legal principles
governing all contracts, including contracts of insurance.4 0 In
other words the court doesn't think the nature of insurance
makes it subject to any different rules than other contracts.
2. The prudent man theory is clearly an inadequate basis on
which to rest the liability of an insurance company in tort.41

This is apparently the extent of the comment on the prudent
man theory.
3. To imply a contract to act promptly on an application for
insurance is a promise for future action and requires consideration. No legal benefit was bestowed on the insurance company
and no intended legal detriment was suffered by the applicant. 42
4. Making the insurance company trustee for the premium
* * .assumes a trust agreement, including an agreement,
expressed or implied, that what has been paid will not be
38. 116 Conn. 526, 165 AtI. 686 (1933).

39. Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 Conn. 526, 528, 165 At. 686, 688
(1933).
40. Ibid.

41. Zayc v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 338 Pa. 426, 13 A2d 34
(1940).
42. Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 Conn. 526, 165 AUt. 686 (1933).
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held indefinitely if the application is not accepted. If this
be granted the full duty of the trustee is to return the premium advanced. The further assumption that the trustee
has agreed to act one way or the other on the application
and has therefrom a contractual duty to act begs the whole
question as to whether there is such a duty. Moreover, the
enforcement of a trust, and the awarding of damages incidental to its violation, is for equity, not for a court of law.4 3
5. As to the reason that the insurance company should not be
allowed to unduly prolong the retention of the premium without
incurring risk the only answer is that "no liability" courts consider retention of premiums immaterial.4 4
The one argument that covers the entire tort liability area is
that courts that impose liability are engaging in judicial legislation.
It is apparent if liability is here to be imposed in an
action ex delicto this court will be compelled to engage in
judicial legislation. If and when it is desirable to impose
upon insurers additional burdens as requirements, the same
should come through the legislative department and not by
virtue of judge-made law.45
The idea seems to be that under the franchise the insurance company submits to regulation by the legislature under its police
powers, and that the court does not have the power to "legislate"
a legal duty upon the insurance company. To this end such a
statute enacted in North Dakota has been upheld by the United
46
States Supreme Court.
D.

outh CarolinaLaw at the Time of Hinds v. United Ins. Co.
of Am& a

The contract theory was firmly entrenched in South Carolina
when Hinds reached the court. In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
43. Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of United States, 2 F. Supp. 914,
917 (W.D. Mo. 1933).
44, Hayes v. Durham Life Ins. Co., 198 Va. 670, 96 S.E. 2d 109 (1957).
45. Schliep v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 479,

-,

254 N.W.

618, 622 (1934).
46. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922). The statute,
CouP. LAWS N.D. § 4902 (1913), made the policy applied for go into effect

if the insurance company had not notified the applicant of rejection within
the required time.
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Garvi&47 and.in Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 48 the

court had held for the plaintiff in contract based on estoppel or
implied acceptance. The court had set out the usual set of requirements, retention of premium and misleading representations.49 Significantly, the court had also shown its adoption of
the idea that the insurance business was affected by public interest and as a result it was under a legal duty to act within a
reasonable time on applications. 0 The court had also granted
a remedy in tort in Tobacco Redrying, there also adhering to the
doctrine that an insurance company was under a legal duty. 1
It is apparent, therefore, that the court had entertained both
theories and found both acceptable.
Further, the court had disposed itself to be more liberal towards the insured in the area of suits for the breach of contracts
of insurance. No other jurisdiction has allowed punitive damages
in a suit for breach of an insurance contract.52 The disposition
of the court in this area is indicated by the fact that given a
fraudulent act 53 the court has not hesitated to affirm a judg-

ment of punitive damages.54 Since a suit for breach of contract

in which punitive damages are sought presupposes the existence
of a contract, it is not likely that punitive damages would be
allowed in a delay situation. There is no authority for wholly
discounting such a possibility however.
With this background, the decision in Hinds allowing a
remedy in tort can hardly be termed a surprise. The court merely
carried out its established policy. The decision allowing punitive
damages, also no surprise, is significant because it purifies the
tort by removing the stigma of damages limited by the policy.
E. Condusion
It is submitted that the decision in Hinds is clearly correct.
It cannot be subjected to the argument that it is judicial legisla47. 136 S.C. 307, 133 S.E. 29 (1926).
48. 222 S.C. 492, 73 S.E.2d 688 (1952).
49. Ward v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 232 S.C. 582, 103 S.E.2d 48 (1958);
Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 222 S.C. 492, 73 S.E.2d 688 (1952).
50. Moore v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., supra note 49.
51. Tobacco Redrying Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 S.C.
162, 193 S.E. 426 (1937).
52. Mooney, supra note 13.
53. Blackmon v. United Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 424, 105 S.E.2d 521 (1958)
(dictum); Monroe v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 232 S.C. 363, 102 S.E.2d 207
(1958) (dictum).
54. Howser, The Awarding of Punitive Damages for Breach of Insurance
Contractsin South Carolina, 1 S.C.L.Q. 150 (1948).
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tion because there is an established legislative policy against
allowing insurance companies to delay unreasonably in acting
on an application. The legislature by statutes governs the insurance business in South Carolina,5 5 and the Chief Insurance Commissioner is empowered to administer these laws.58 The commissioner, if he finds an insurance company acting capriciously on
applications as a practice, as opposed to an isolated incident,
may call a hearing on the practice of the insurance company.
If the insurance company cannot sustain the validity of its
actions by evidence that it was acting in good faith, the commissioner may revoke the insurance company's license to do business
in South Carolina. 57 With this established policy present, though
the court took no specific notice of it, the decision in Hinds
served to enforce the policy declared by the legislature, clearly
within the realm of the court's authority. Because the court is
enforcing the legislative mandate, all other arguments against
this remedy seem to dissolve.
Roy L. FEREE

55. S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 37 (1962).
56. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-56 (1962).

57. Interview with Chief Deputy Insurance Commissioner of South Carolina,
Mr. Howard Clark, in Columbia, Nov. 16, 1966. It should be added that the
power of the commissioner to do this is not found in express terms, but from
a reading of the statutes the power becomes evident, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 37-107(d) (1962), where the commissioner can refuse to license a foreign

insurance company to do business in South Carolina if it has a history of
improper insurance practice.
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TAXATION-CHANGE OF ACCOUNTING METHODTAXPAYER USING UNIT-LIVESTOCK-PRICE
METHOD CANNOT CHANGE TO CASH
BASIS TO ACCOUNT FOR SALES
OF BREEDING CATrLE*
The recent case of United States v. Catto1 involved ranchers
who sought refunds of income taxes paid, claiming that they
had the right to change from the accrual unit-livestock-price
method to the cash method in accounting for gains derived from
sales of their breeding cattle. The unit-livestock-price method,
which the ranchers had used to compute their taxes, is a system
of accounting for cattle inventory under which a herd is divided
into categories according to kind and age with each animal considered a unit. "If a cattle raiser determines that it costs approximately $15 to produce a calf and $7.50 each year to raise the calf
to maturity, his classifications and unit prices would be as follows: calves, $15; yearlings, $22.50; 2-year olds, $30; mature animals, $37.50.112 Each year the increase in the cattle inventory
resulting from the increased unit value is taken into ordinary
income. This income is offset, however, by expenses which the
rancher incurs for feed and other costs in raising the animal.
Under this method of accounting, theoretically, expenses incurred by the rancher in raising the livestock are accumulated
in the inventory values until the animals are sold, whereas under
the cash method of accounting for livestock there is no accumulation of inventory costs and the amounts spent for raising the
cattle are deducted as expenses in the year that they are incurred.
Livestock which are held for breeding purposes are taxed at a
capital gains rate3 (25%), which is normally lower than the rate
for ordinary income. It can be seen that in accounting for breeding animals a rancher using the cash basis has a tax advantage
over a rancher who uses the unit-livestock-price method because
not only does a cash basis rancher get an earlier deduction, but
also he is able to offset his expenses incurred in raising the livestock against ordinary income rather than offset capital gains
income. 4
* United States v. Catto, 86 Sup. Ct 1311 (1966).

1. 86 Sup. Ct. 1311 (1966).
2. Treas. Reg. § l.471-6(e) (1944).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231(b) (3). Capital gains treatment is also
available to livestock held over twelve months for draft or dairy purposes.
4. 3B MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIo 569 § 22.130 (1958).
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In Catto there was no question that the cattle were breeding
animals (as opposed to animals raised for slaughter which are
taxed as ordinary income) and deserved capital gains treatment.
The sole issue was whether the taxpayer should use the unitlivestock-price method or the cash method to determine his gain
in the sale.
In 1958 the Fifth Circuit was faced with this same issue in
&oofieldv. Lewis. The ranchers wanted to remove their breeding
livestock from the unit-livestock-price inventory and give those
cattle a zero basis to be used in determining the capital gains
from their sale. This was in direct conflict with Treas. Reg.
§ 1.411-6(f) 0 which specified that if a taxpayer used the unitlivestock-price method he must apply it to aZI livestock raised.
Another regulation 7 stipulated that a taxpayer may not change
his method of accounting without securing the consent of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The court allowed the taxpayer to use the zero basis (the result of the cash method) to
determine the gain. The court held that the regulation that required a rancher to include a breeding animal in inventory was
invalid because it was in direct conflict with section 117(j) of
the Internal Revenue Code." Not only did section 117(j), as
amended in 1951, say that livestock held for breeding purposes
was property used in trade or business and "not property of a
kind which would properly be includible in the inventory of the
taxpayer

. . .,-9

but also the court felt that when Congress

amended section 117(j), its intention was to allow all livestock
raisers to have the full benefit of a capital gains treatment rather
than to make some accrual taxpayers reduce their capital gains
upon disposition by decreasing ordinary income in earlier years.
The court also reasoned that since the regulation which required
the taxpayer to use the unit-livestock-price method for his breeding animals was invalid, the taxpayer's use of the cash method
did not constitute a change in accounting methods and thus it
was not necessary to obtain permission from the Commissioner.
When met with the same problem in 1961, the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits rejected the Seofield decision. After a detailed
5. 251 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1958).
6. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(c)-6 as amended by T.D. 5423, 1945

CuM.

BULL. 70.

7. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.41-2 [now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(e)].
8. Now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231.
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231(b) (1).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol18/iss5/7

28

et al.: COMMENTS
1966]

COMMMNTs

analysis of the history of the statutes and regulations in question
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. E7berg'0 concluded that the 1951 amendment allowing capital gains
treatment to breeding livestock regardless of age, although enacted subsequent to the promulgation of § 1.4*71-6, did not invalidate the regulation. The court felt that the intent of Congress
when it passed the 1951 amendment was to clarify the confusion
that had existed and to codify the case law in the area of gains
from the sale of breeding animals. 1 The court also noted that
Scofield had been limited to its facts within its own circuit; 12
that the accrual basis had some advantages over the cash basis
which were not brought out in Scofield; and that the taxpayer
must assume the burdens as well as the benefits of the system
that he had selected of his own free choice. Having deduced from
its analysis that Scofield was wrong in holding § 1.471-6(f)
invalid, the court concluded that the taxpayer's actions in E 7berg
were a change in accounting method and required the Commissioner's consent, which he was justified in refusing.
When the Ninth Circuit rejected the Scofield reasoning in
Little v. Commissioner,'3 it emphasized that regardless of the
accounting method used (cash or accrual), "costs attributable to
items receiving capital gains treatment are customarily capitalized throughout their life and are reflected in the ultimate adjusted basis of the goods at the time of their sale or disposition,"' 4 and including the breeding cattle in the inventory was
a simpler way of obtaining this result. Having reached this
conclusion, the court then sought to explain why taxpayers using
the cash method did not have to capitalize their costs in raising
breeding livestock, and the only explanation offered was that
each system has its own benefits and that a taxpayer should not
get the benefits of both but should adhere to a unified system as
prescribed by the Commissioner.
10. 291 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1961).
11. See H. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 32, 1951-2 Cum.

BULL.

380.

12. In Carter v. Commissioner, 257 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1958), the taxpayer
tried to use the cost of breeding animals that he had purch=ed (as opposed to
raised) as the basis of his gain from sale rather than the unit-livestock-price
inventory value. The court in limiting Scofield to its facts pointed out that a
rancher who used the unit-livestock-price method is permitted by § 1.471-6 to
keep purchased cattle out of inventory; and once the taxpayer adopted the
method of including them in inventory, he could not change at will.
13. 294 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1961).
14. Id. at 663-64.
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In United States v. Catto'5 the United States Supreme Court
had to resolve the conflict between the Fifth Circuit and the
17
6
Eighth and Ninth Circuits. The District and Circuit Courts
had allowed the Catto taxpayers the refund, following the Scofield decision. The Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits and holding (1) that the costs of
raising breeding livestock were of a capital nature and therefore
should be deferred by accrual-method taxpayers; (2) that Treas.
Reg. § 1.471-6(f) requiring ranchers who used the unit-livestockprice method to include their breeding animals in inventory was
a valid Regulation; (3) that it was within the Commissioner's
discretion to refuse to allow the taxpayers to make this change
and that in doing so, he had not acted arbitrarily; and (4) that
the discriminatory tax advantage afforded a cash basis taxpayer
over an accrual taxpayer was not a sufficient reason to allow the
taxpayers to change methods. The taxpayers were not entitled
to take advantage of every shift in the revenue laws and, moreover, they were not asking to switch entirely to the cash method
but rather to have a hybrid system offering the advantages of
both.
The taxpayers' strongest contention in this case was that the
costs of raising breeding livestock were not to be deferred in
inventory but should be expensed currently. To support this
position they cited a forty-five year old Regulation 8 which
specified that feed and other costs of raising livestock may be
deducted currently. The government argued that this regulation
must be considered in connection with Regulation § 1.161-4(b)
which requires that this expense be offset by income resulting
from the increase in inventory due to the increased value of livestock. But the taxpayers pointed out that § 1.161-4 also indicates that breeding livestock need not be in inventory, and it
follows that once freed from inventory the current expenses are
not balanced by the ordinary income. The only statute or regulation that requires a taxpayer to include breeding livestock in
inventory is § 1.471-6(f), but this applies only to accrual basis
taxpayers who use the unit-livestock-price method. The court,
despite this lack of administrative or statutory authority, con15. 86 Sup. Ct. 1311 (1966).

16. Catto v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 663 (D.C.W.D. Tex. 1963); Wardlaw v, United States, 223 F. Supp. 631 (D.C.W.D. Tex. 1963).
17. United States v. Catto, 344 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v.

Wardlaw 344 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1965).
18. Now Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12 (1958).
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cluded that the expenses of raising breeding livestock should
be capitalized. Its reasoning was based upon the broad policy
that costs incurred in the acquisition, production or development
of property used in trade or business must be deferred. 19
Once it is stated that all costs of raising breeding livestock
should be capitalized, the question arises why are cash method
taxpayers not required to defer them?. Theoretically, the only
difference between the cash basis and the accrual basis should
be the timing of deductions; if costs are to be deferred, both
20
systems should be required to defer them.
The reason for this difference might be explained by the history of the statutes and regulations concerning farmers. Early
in the history of the income tax law the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner liberalized the cash method to allow
a current deduction for the cost of raising animals in the interest of giving the farmers a more simplified method of accounting.21 At that time capital gains treatment was not allowed for
breeding livestock and therefore there was no difference in the
two methods. 22 Then in 1942 § 117(j) was enacted 23 allowing
capital gains on property used in trade or business, but even after
the amendment "the Commissioner as a practical matter and
largely without success, .. .consistently resisted and attempted

to limit the allowance of capital gains treatment to breeding
livestock. '24 Finally the case law that had developed was codified
into the 1951 amendment to § 111 (j) and livestock held for draft,
breeding, or dairy purposes, regardless of age, was allowed capital gains treatment.25 When this amendment was passed, both
Congressional Committee Reports emphasized that gains from
sales should be computed in accordance with the method presently employed. 2 6 After the 1951 amendment the Secretary of
the Treasury asked Congress to make cash basis taxpayers capi19. The court cited Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 263 (capital expenditures),
471 (inventories), 1011-13, 1016 (a) (1) (the various basis statutes); Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-2(a) (1958), 1.471-1 (1958), 1.1016-2 (1957).
20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c) (1957).

21. United States v. Catto, 86 Sup. Ct. 1311, 1315-16 (1966).
22. Id. at 1316.

23. Now Int Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231.
24. United States v. Ekberg, 291 F2d 913, 921 (8th Cir. 1961).

25. Ch. 521, 65 Stat. 452, § 324 (1951)

§ 1231(b) (3)].

[now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,

26. S. REP. No. 781, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 42, 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 488; H.
REP. No. 586, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 32, 1951-2 Cum. BuL.. 380.
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talize costs.27 Ranching interests introduced a bill to allow

accrual taxpayers a current deduction for the cost of raising
breeding cattle.28 Neither faction won and § 1231 was enacted
without changing the livestock provision.
The Court had to use this historical background to explain an
exception that immediately arose once it held the cost of raising
livestock must be capitalized. Also in holding this the Court chose
the broad policy and accounting concept that all "costs incurred
in the acquisition, production, or development of capital assets,
inventory, and other property used in the trade or business may
not be currently deducted, but must be deferred until the year
of sale ' 2 0 rather than a specific regulation"° which provides that
the costs of feed and other costs in raising livestock may be
expensed.
Since the Court felt that the costs of raising livestock were of
a capital nature, it had little trouble in upholding the validity
of Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6. This, of course, overruled Scofield.
Next, it held that the Commissioner's refusal to allow this change
in method was within his discretion and not arbitrary. The discretion of the Commissioner in granting a change in accounting
method has been held repeatedly to be very broad.3 1
The fortunate advantage of the cash basis taxpayer in this
situation bothered the Court somewhat, but despite the difference in the two systems, it felt that the Commissioner is not
required to allow a change in method every time a fluctuation
occurs in the tax law; once a taxpayer has selected an accounting
method, he takes it with the risk that the law or the Commissioner's rulings might change. 2 There might be a case in which
it would be completely inequitable to compel a taxpayer to adhere to a method, but in Catto since the taxpayers sought a
hybrid cash and accrual system with the benefits of both rather
27. Brief for Petitioner, Writ of Certiorari, p. 15 United States v. Catto, 86
Sup. Ct. 1311 (1966).
28. Ibid.
29. United States v. Catto, 86 Sup. Ct. 1311, 1315 (1966).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12 (1958).
31. E.g., Auto Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957); Brown
v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934); American Co. v. Commissioner 317 F.2d
604 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Commissioner v. 0. Liquidating Corp. 292 F.2d 225 (3d
Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Ekberg, 291 F.2d 913 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Irvine v.
United States, 212 F. Supp. 937 (1963); Peterson Product Co. v. United
States, 205 F. Supp. 229 (1962) aff'd, 313 F.2d 609; Broida, Stone & Thomas,
Inc. v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 841 (1962) af'd, 309 F.2d 486.
32. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1947); Hel.
vering v. Wilshire, 308 U.S. 90 (1939).
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than a consistent application of one method, the Court felt that
there was no such inequity.
There was no inequity despite the fact that the taxpayer in
Wa'dZaw"3 had not "elected"3 4 the unit-livestock-price method.
In 1944 when the unit-livestock-price method was promulgated,
the Wardlaw taxpayer was required to use the unit-livestockprice method because of a previous method that he had used.
His original choice of accounting system was without the benefit
of any knowledge of capital gains treatment of breeding livestock or of the requirement that he use the unit-livestock-price
method. So it can be seen that the Supreme Court's holding
extends not only to a method of accounting which a taxpayer
has selected, but also to a method which he was required to follow due to a previous election.
WILIA

S. ELDER

33. The Wardlaw and Catto cases were consolidated for hearing before the
Supreme Court. See Wardlaw v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 631 (D.C.W.D.

Tex. 1963) aff'd, 344 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1963).

34. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6(f) (1958): "A taxpayer who elects to
use the unit-livestock-price method must apply it to all livestock raised
whether for ... breeding ...
purposes."
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